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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3472 
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District Judge:  Hon. Anita B. Brody 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
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Before:   RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 31, 2014 ) 
_______________ 
 
Kimberly M. Dolan   [ARGUED] 
Regional Housing Legal Services 
2 S. Easton Road 
Glenside, PA  19038 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Molly S. Lorber   [ARGUED] 
Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney 
3 South Penn Square 
Philadelphia, PA   19107 
          Counsel for Appellees 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Rodney Collins, a Pennsylvania prisoner convicted in 1993 of 
first-degree murder, appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Although the 
District Court denied his petition, it certified two questions 
_______________ 
          * Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Court of 
Appeals Senior Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by 
designation.
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for appeal: whether Collins was deprived of his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because 
his trial counsel “inadequately prepared for trial and 
completely failed to conduct any investigation, including into 
the ballistics evidence” (J.A. at A0004), and whether trial 
counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, combined with 
alleged errors of the trial court, cumulatively caused him 
prejudice.  Despite serious doubt that trial counsel conducted 
an adequate investigation, we conclude that, given the 
uncontroverted evidence presented against Collins at trial, the 
state court determination that Collins failed to show he 
suffered prejudice was not an unreasonable application of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which sets forth the standard for 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1).  Collins also has not exhausted his claim of 
cumulative error, which is therefore procedurally defaulted 
and not properly before us.  Consequently, we will affirm the 
District Court’s ruling denying his habeas corpus petition.   
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
In the summer of 1992, a feud developed between, on 
one side, Collins, Andre Graves, and Kevin Cofer and, on the 
other, a West Philadelphia gang known as the “Boys from the 
Bottom.”  On the night of July 12th of that year, Collins went 
to his girlfriend’s house and reported that the Boys from the 
Bottom were going to kill Graves, whom the gang members 
had recently beaten.  Collins told Graves of the threat, and 
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Graves and Cofer then joined Collins in driving around 
Philadelphia in a station wagon, looking for the Boys from 
the Bottom.  Cofer drove, Graves sat in the front passenger 
seat, and Collins sat in the backseat.  After searching for 
several hours, they eventually returned to the neighborhood 
where they started, about a block from Collins’s girlfriend’s 
house.  At that point, according to Cofer, while the three were 
still in the car, Collins suddenly drew a gun and shot Graves.     
 
Early the next morning, police found Graves’s body in 
the front seat of the station wagon with gunshot wounds as 
the apparent cause of death.  Among the wounds were two 
bullet holes in Graves’s head, with exit wounds under his 
right eye and near his right ear.  A bullet had also grazed his 
skull.  Police found bullet casings in the rear passenger 
compartment, under the driver’s seat, and in the street behind 
the car.  They also found two bullets in the passenger-side 
dashboard and in the passenger door, and two other bullets in 
the porches of nearby houses, as well as a fragment of a bullet 
in the street next to the car.  Forensic testing established that 
all of the bullets were fired from the same .45 caliber gun.   
 
Homicide detectives interviewed Cofer, who told them 
that he saw Collins shoot Graves at point blank range from 
the backseat of the station wagon.  Cofer said that, after the 
shooting, he followed as Collins ran to Collins’s girlfriend’s 
house.  Once there, Collins told her that someone had driven 
by the station wagon and shot Graves.  Cofer also said that he 
later returned to the station wagon to retrieve the car keys and 
a shotgun.   
 
Collins was eventually arrested for Graves’s murder, 
and, in May 1993, he was tried and convicted of that crime.  
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His trial counsel was Louis Savino.  At the trial, the 
Commonwealth presented eye-witness testimony from Cofer; 
ballistics testimony from Police Officer John Finor and a 
chemist named Ronald McCoy; testimony from a medical 
examiner, Dr. Gregory McDonald, regarding the physical 
evidence from Graves’s body; and other testimony bearing on 
the events surrounding the murder.  Collins testified in his 
own defense.  He told the jury that, on the day in question, 
after he, Graves, and Cofer had searched the neighborhood, 
Cofer dropped him off and, while walking to his girlfriend’s 
house, he heard gunshots.  Collins stated that, after he heard 
the shots, Cofer ran up behind him and told him that some 
people “just got finished dumping on us,” i.e., shooting at the 
car.  (J.A. at A0828.)   Based on Collins’s testimony and 
proposed inferences from the evidence, Savino argued to the 
jury that the shots came from outside the car.  He later 
described his trial strategy as attempting to create reasonable 
doubt by casting suspicion alternatively on the Boys from the 
Bottom and on Cofer as the possible shooters.
1
   
                                              
1
 During post-conviction proceedings, Savino testified 
he had argued that “Kevin Cofer … is the one who killed 
[Graves] by shooting from outside of the car”  (J.A. at 
A1231), and that he also “stated … with a lot of emphasis that 
the [B]oys from the [B]ottom might have been involved” (id. 
at A1245).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court characterized 
Savino’s trial strategy as “choosing to cast suspicion 
simultaneously on both Cofer and the supposed Boys from 
the Bottom.”  Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 249 
(Pa. 2008).  That court described Savino’s cross-examination 
of the Commonwealth’s experts as “elicit[ing] testimony… 
that the shots could have been fired by Kevin Cofer from the 
driver’s seat,” id.; however, we find no evidence in the record 
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1. Ballistics Testing2 
 
Much of the argument in this and earlier iterations of 
Collins’s battle for post-conviction relief has centered on the 
trial court’s admission of “last-minute” testing on the front 
passenger-seat headrest.  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6.)  
Two days before trial, the Commonwealth told Savino that 
McCoy had conducted additional tests on the headrest, that 
the results were positive for lead residue from gun powder, 
and that McCoy would identify the residue and its 
implications, while Officer Finor would opine on ballistics 
conclusions that could be drawn from the testing.  During jury 
selection, Savino learned that the tests showed a particular 
pattern of lead residue on the headrest, but he did not see the 
actual test results until the trial had begun.   
 
On the first day of trial, Savino informed the court that 
he had recently been notified of the testing but had not seen a 
report.  Savino said that the testing was a “complete surprise” 
and that the report “could be crucial in light of the case the 
shooter might have been outside of the car as compared to 
being inside of the car.”  (J.A. at A0265.)  Regarding the new 
evidence about the headrest, Savino also told the court “I am 
sure it will require great investigation on my part and possibly 
some work with experts to see if the tests are accurate.”  (Id. 
at A0266.)  The court noted that “[Savino] might as well get 
                                                                                                     
that Savino varied from his insistence that the shots were 
fired from outside the car. 
2
 As do the parties, we use the term “ballistics testing” 
broadly to include not only testing and conclusions about 
bullet trajectories and identification but also about chemical 
testing and related evidence.  
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rolling on an expert now.”  (Id.)  Savino never consulted an 
expert.   
 
When the Commonwealth provided the testing report 
to Savino, it showed a lead residue pattern on the passenger-
seat headrest “traversing from the left side and front to the 
middle of the headrest.”  (Id. at A0508-09.)  Savino moved to 
exclude the report, but the court denied the motion.  He 
alternatively requested “a reasonable period to conduct 
whatever testing that we can do to try to refute” the evidence, 
but that was likewise denied.  (Id. at A0509-11.)  The court 
entered into a discussion with Savino about ballistics testing 
for the defense, at one point asking “[w]hat kind of test do 
you want to make?”  (J.A. at A510.)  Savino responded, “I 
don’t know what kind of tests.  The Commonwealth puts the 
defense in a very difficult position.”  (Id.)  Savino went on to 
argue that “[t]he question remains whether someone was in 
the car doing the shooting or outside the car,” to which the 
court confusingly responded “[i]t would be lead whether it 
came from the outside or the inside.  The bullets were in the 
inside and that is where the lead was.”  (Id. at A510-11.)   
 
At that point, the Commonwealth also told Savino that 
McCoy and Finor would testify about the lead residue and 
corresponding ballistics conclusions and that Savino could 
talk to Finor before the testimony.  Savino, however, did not 
interview Finor.  In fact, he did not interview any of the 
Commonwealth’s witnesses.  He later said, “I interviewed no 
Commonwealth witnesses in Mr. Collins’[s] case, nor do I, 
with few exceptions, ever interview Commonwealth 
witnesses in homicides.”  (J.A. at A1236.)   
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As promised by the Commonwealth, Finor took the 
stand.  Relying on the headrest testing, as well as ballistics 
tests he performed that very morning, he testified that the 
murder weapon was fired no more than eighteen inches from 
the headrest.  He also testified that the presence and shape of 
the bullet holes in nearby porches and in the dashboard, as 
well as the hole in the passenger door, were consistent with 
shots fired from behind Graves.  McCoy testified in 
conformity with his report regarding the lead residue on the 
headrest.    
 
2. Cofer’s Testimony 
 
Although Cofer was the Commonwealth’s key witness, 
at trial he recanted his prior statements and instead claimed 
that, when initially interviewed by the police and at the 
pretrial hearing, he had lied about being present when Graves 
was shot because the police threatened to charge him with the 
homicide and told him that Collins had implicated him in the 
shooting.  The prosecution thus decided to read into the 
record Cofer’s prior statements to police and his preliminary 
hearing testimony.  The prosecutor went through every line of 
the prior statements, asking Cofer if he gave a specific 
answer, to which Cofer answered yes, and then asking if the 
answer given was true, to which Cofer answered no.  By this 
process, the prosecution highlighted details of Cofer’s 
original testimony that would have been difficult to fabricate.   
 
In addition, the prosecutor was able to point out that 
Cofer had earlier told detectives of Collins’s motive for the 
murder.  According to Cofer, Collins had explained to him 
that he killed Graves because “[h]e could have got us 
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rocked,” i.e., killed, in the feud with the Boys from the 
Bottom.  (J.A. at A0307 (internal quotation marks omitted).)   
 
On the second day of his testimony, Cofer attempted to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  
Retaking the witness stand, after a weekend recess, Cofer 
stated, “[a]t this point, I will invoke my Fifth Amendment 
Right and plead the Fifth.”  (J.A. at A0390.)  The prosecutor 
asked whether he had been threatened over the weekend and, 
after saying that he had not, Cofer continued to answer 
questions.  Savino objected, stating his concern that Cofer had 
invoked the Fifth Amendment.  To which the court replied, 
“[h]ow can you invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege when 
you have been spilling it out for the last two days?”  (Id. at 
A0393.)  After more testimony, Savino again raised his 
concern with the court, stating, “if this witness does invoke 
his Fifth Amendment privilege now,” there would be “no 
opportunity to cross examine him.”  (Id. at A0412.)  As it 
turned out, however, Savino was able to cross-examine Cofer 
and to elicit the admission that Cofer had originally told 
detectives he was not present at the shooting but later 
changed his story.  In addition, the cross-examination 
established that Cofer had known Graves longer than Cofer 
had known Collins, and that Cofer was closer to Graves than 
to Collins.  Savino also questioned Cofer regarding his 
possible implication in the homicide.  Although Cofer was 
clearly a crucial witness, Savino did not try to interview him 
before the cross-examination.   
 
To discredit Cofer’s changed testimony, the 
Commonwealth introduced two letters, which were given to 
the prosecutor during a lunch break on the second day of the 
trial by a woman identifying herself as Cofer’s mother.  The 
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letters were purportedly from Collins and asked Cofer not to 
testify against him.  On the stand, Cofer refused to read the 
letters, so the prosecutor read them into the record over 
Savino’s objection.  The first letter began:  
 
What’s up, Kev. (Kabir).  In an effort to 
straighten out this (lie) that’s about to cost an 
innocent man his life, the necessary steps must 
be taken to clear us both.  I prefer to do it this 
way cause (Louis Savino) is trying to turn the 
tables from one innocent man (me) to another. 
…[S]o to clear us both, you must sign and fill 
out this form, and return it to me cause I didn’t 
no [sic] anything to tell the police so there I 
refused to work with this lawyer to try and put 
you on the spot. 
 
(Id. at A0537-38.) 
 
The letter went on to ask that Cofer swear to a 
statement that read, in part, “I, (Kevin Cofer) have made a 
grave mistake and worked along with the police … in an 
effort to commit and convict an [i]nnocent man of murder.”  
(Id. at A0539.)  The proposed statement continued, “[a]ll 
these (lies) forced me into signing a false statement for fear 
that I would be charged with (murder).”  (Id.)  When the 
prosecutor asked Cofer whether “everything you told this jury 
about your not being involved … [and] the police setting you 
up and threatening you was a result of this letter,” Cofer 
refused to answer.  (Id. at A0539-40.)  Savino objected and 
moved for a mistrial, neither of which succeeded.  The 
prosecutor then read into the record the second letter, which 
stated in part: 
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Look Blood, you know from first hand 
experience about jail, so why is you putting me 
through this sucker … .  I mean if you going to 
straighten this out, and free an innocent black 
man, look, I know how them devils put they 
thing down when it comes to these bodies but 
that’s past and you hold the key to my release.   
 
(Id. at A0541.) 
 
After another objection from Savino, the prosecutor 
finished reading the letter, which ended with: “Look, man, I 
know you ain’t that type of dude that want to be label a snitch 
and I know for real you ain’t built like that, so straighten this 
out as soon as possible.”  (Id. at A0542.) 
 
Savino once more objected to questioning a witness 
who had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and moved for 
a mistrial.  The court again overruled the objection.
3
   
 
3. The Medical Examiner 
 
Dr. Gregory McDonald, the medical examiner who 
performed Graves’s autopsy, also testified at trial, specifically 
discussing the three gunshot wounds to Graves’s head.  
                                              
3
 The prosecution also requested and received a 
handwriting exemplar from Collins.  Collins asserts that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that the letters were written by 
him and that “[a]n analysis at trial confirmed that they were 
not in [his] handwriting.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 18 n.6.)  
Collins, however, only directs our attention to sections of his 
own testimony where he denied writing the letters.   
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McDonald found an “entrance wound in the left side of the 
head slightly above the left ear and slightly behind the left ear 
and that went through the skull … and exit[ed] out of the 
right side of the head, slightly behind and slightly above the 
right ear.”  (J.A. at A0674.)  He summarized the trajectory of 
the shot that caused the wound as “rightward, slightly 
downward and forward.”  (Id. at A0676.)  He testified that 
another bullet went from “slightly above and slightly behind 
the left ear … out the right side of the face just below the 
right eye.”  (Id. at A0674-75.)  McDonald said the trajectory 
of that shot was “forward, to the right, and slightly 
downward.”  (Id. at A0678.)  He also found a “graze wound 
of the left upper portion of the head going forward and to the 
right.”  (Id. at A0674.)  The Commonwealth argued that 
Graves’s wounds and the fact that the bullet trajectories were 
primarily forward and to the right were consistent with shots 
fired from the backseat.  On cross-examination, Savino 
elicited the admission that McDonald could not state exactly 
how far away from Graves’s head the shots were fired.    
 
4. Corroborating Witnesses 
 
Other witnesses testified at trial that Collins had been 
trying to find Graves on the day of the murder; that Collins 
owned a black .45 caliber handgun that he was carrying when 
he met with Cofer and Graves; that he had been in the 
backseat of the car, with Cofer and Graves in front; and that 
he later ran into his girlfriend’s apartment with blood on his 
knee and behaving nervously.    
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5. Savino’s Theory of the Case 
 
Notwithstanding the physical evidence and the expert 
testimony about it, Savino’s theory of the case was that the 
shooter was outside the car because there were bullet casings 
found outside and behind the car and because the Boys from 
the Bottom had a motive to kill Graves.  Savino also wanted 
the jury to consider that Cofer had something to hide because 
he immediately fled the scene of the crime when his lifelong 
friend, Graves, was shot.  The defense closing, therefore, 
pursued two different themes: that the Boys from the Bottom 
had a motive for murder and that Cofer was an unreliable 
witness and perhaps was the actual shooter.  Whoever the 
shooter was, Savino maintained, it was not Collins because 
the shots came from outside the car.
 
 Savino’s closing 
argument was almost evenly split between casting suspicion 
on Cofer and on the Boys from the Bottom.    
 
The jury evidently believed neither of those 
alternatives.  It found Collins guilty, and he was sentenced to 
death.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. Direct Appeal   
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Collins’s 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  See Commonwealth 
v. Collins, 702 A.2d 540, 541 (Pa. 1997).  It held that the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for first-degree 
murder, and it rejected Collins’s three claims of error, 
namely: (1) that the Commonwealth’s tactics, specifically 
eliciting testimony from Cofer regarding his failure to testify 
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in accordance with his prior statements, were inflammatory; 
(2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
those tactics; and (3) that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
requesting an alibi instruction related to Collins’s testimony 
that he left the car before the shots.  Having concluded that 
Collins’s conviction for first-degree murder was sound, the 
court affirmed his death sentence.  Id. at 546.  The United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Collins v. 
Pennsylvania, 525 U.S. 835 (1998).   
 
2. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings  
 
Collins then collaterally attacked his conviction and 
sentence.  See Commonwealth v. Collins, 2005 WL 6347804 
(Phila. Ct. Com. Pl., Feb. 15, 2005); Commonwealth v. 
Collins, 957 A.2d 237 (Pa. 2008).  He filed a petition under 
Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq., making 25 claims of error.  
The PCRA court granted a hearing as to six claims, which 
included the assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to hire a ballistics expert.  At the PCRA hearing, 
Savino testified that he had considered retaining a ballistics 
expert but decided not to, for strategic reasons.  Specifically, 
he testified regarding his belief that, if he called an expert, the 
resulting report could have been discoverable by the 
Commonwealth and might have undermined Collins’s 
defense.
4
  In addition, Savino testified that his strategy was to 
                                              
4
 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 305 
applied to pre-trial discovery at the time of Collins’s trial.  
Under Rule 305(C)(2)(a), a court could order the production 
of  “results or reports ... of scientific tests ... that the 
defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or were 
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create a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds as to where the 
shots came from.  He said he “argued to the jury that there 
was no proof that Mr. Collins fired any shots from the back 
seat of that car.  And in fact, Mr. Cofer, Kevin Cofer, the 
Commonwealth witness, is the one who killed the gentleman 
by shooting from outside of the car.”  (J.A. at A1231.)  
Savino confirmed that he interviewed no witnesses and did 
not consult any experts in preparation for the guilt phase of 
Collins’s trial.     
 
William Welch, a ballistics expert, testified at the 
PCRA hearing on behalf of Collins.  His testimony focused 
on the direction from which the shots were fired.  Welch said 
that Finor’s ballistics testing was unreliable because the test 
shots had been fired directly into the test material.  He also 
disputed the results because only one shot was fired in testing 
despite multiple shots having been fired in the actual murder, 
and because the testing was not done with the murder 
weapon.  Welch testified that if the shooter had been sitting in 
the backseat of the car, it would have been awkward to reach 
around the headrest to fire in a way that was consistent with 
the physical evidence.  He also stated that he would have 
been available to review the evidence at Collins’s trial, had he 
been called.     
 
                                                                                                     
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at 
the trial ... .”  Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(C)(2)(a).  Collins argues 
that if the expert report was not favorable for the defense, 
Savino never would have had to call the expert, and the report 
would not have been discoverable. 
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On cross-examination, however, Welch conceded that 
the physical evidence was consistent with a shooter inside the 
car – either in the driver’s seat or the backseat.  As to physical 
evidence – particularly lead residue and bullet holes – counsel 
for the Commonwealth asked Welch if it was “consistent with 
a gun being fired in that car,” and Welch responded, “It is.”  
(Id. at A1194.)  The questioning went on: 
 
Q:  Would you agree that the physical evidence 
in that car is, in fact, consistent with the 
testimony of Kevin Cofer [implicating Collins]? 
A: Physical evidence, meaning the bullet holes? 
Q: Yes. 
A: It is consistent, but also consistent with that 
of the driver firing the shots. 
 
(Id. at A1195.) 
 
Q: Mr. Welch, your opinion that it would come 
from the driver’s side, you’re giving us your 
opinion it would be awkward physically to 
shoot someone from the back seat, but in order 
to explain a direct back-to-front shot in the 
dashboard, you would have to opine that there 
was a struggle between the driver and the victim 
of some sort and his hand was pushed in order 
to fire directly into the dash board; is that 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That’s not supported by any of the evidence 
that you’ve reviewed in this case; is that 
correct? 
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A: There doesn’t seem to be any physical 
evidence to that effect.  No.  
 
(Id. at A1199-1200.)   
 
The PCRA court dismissed all of Collins’s claims 
except those regarding ineffective assistance of counsel at the 
sentencing phase.  Regarding Savino’s failure to obtain a 
ballistics expert, the PCRA court held that Savino had a 
“reasonable strategy for not retaining a ballistics expert and 
no prejudice has been shown by his failure to do so.”  (Id. at 
A0118.)  Looking to the sentencing phase of the trial, 
however, the court held that Collins was entitled to relief 
because Savino was “ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present [mitigation] evidence,” and appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise Savino’s ineffectiveness with 
respect to sentencing.
5
  (Id. at A0135.)  The court therefore 
vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing.  The Commonwealth decided not to seek 
the death penalty again, and Collins was resentenced to life in 
prison.       
                                              
5
 The PCRA court stated: “If the jury was provided 
accurate information about defendant’s juvenile adjudications 
and available mitigation evidence, there is a reasonable 
probability that at least one juror would have struck a 
different balance and voted not to impose the death penalty. 
… Accordingly, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and present such evidence and appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s 
ineffectiveness in this regard.”  (J.A. at A0135 (citations 
omitted).) 
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Collins then appealed 15 claims to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of a 
new trial.  Collins, 957 A.2d at 243, 272.  Relevant to the 
claims before us, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that 
the issue of Savino’s failure to present expert ballistics 
testimony was properly layered with his claim that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Savino’s 
ineffectiveness.  It also held that “[Savino] did not act in a 
constitutionally unreasonable fashion in choosing to cast 
suspicion simultaneously on both Cofer and the supposed 
Boys from the Bottom gang rather than attempt to find a 
competing defense ballistician to paint Cofer as the only 
possible perpetrator.”  Id. at 249.  The court determined that 
trial counsel made a strategic decision to not hire a ballistics 
expert but, instead, to create a reasonable doubt by casting 
suspicion on others, and, “because appellant failed to show 
that trial counsel lacked a reasonable strategic basis for 
choosing not to call a ballistics expert, his underlying claim 
fails.”  Id. at 250.  In his briefing before that court, Collins 
supported his claim that Savino had pursued a deficient trial 
strategy with, among other things, references to Savino’s 
general lack of preparation and inadequate investigation.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, did not address the 
lack of preparation or investigation that went into Savino’s 
trial strategy, focusing instead on Savino’s decision not to 
hire a ballistics expert.   
 
Collins did not make a cumulative error claim during 
post-conviction proceedings.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court nevertheless reviewed his claims regarding each 
individual error that he now alleges cumulatively prejudiced 
him, and it rejected them all.  See id. at 253-54, 259-60. 
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Collins subsequently filed in the District Court a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 
2254, arguing that he is entitled to relief based on violations 
of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, his right to 
confront Cofer, and his right to due process of law.  The 
District Court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge who, in 
a Report and Recommendation, recommended that the 
petition be denied and no certificate of appealability be 
issued.  The Magistrate Judge determined that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of Collins’s 
ineffectiveness claim was not an unreasonable application of 
federal law under 28 U.S.C § 2254 because it was based on 
deference owed to Savino’s strategic decisions and that 
Savino did not “automatically lose[] the benefit of a 
presumption of reasonable strategic decisionmaking simply 
because he did not consult with a ballistics expert.”  (J.A. at 
A0021.)  Further, the Magistrate Judge noted that, given 
Welch’s concession on cross-examination that the shots could 
have been fired from the driver’s side or the backseat of the 
car, there was no “reasonable probability of an acquittal” 
even if Savino had consulted with an expert.  (Id.)  The 
Magistrate Judge also rejected Collins’s claim of cumulative 
error because, he said, there were no underlying errors.   
 
The District Court approved and adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation as to each 
claim for relief, but it nevertheless stated that trial counsel 
was “clearly inadequate.”  (Id. at A0003.)  It thus certified 
two claims for appeal: (1) Collins’s claim that he was 
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel “because his attorney inadequately prepared for 
trial and completely failed to conduct any investigation, 
including into the ballistics evidence”; and (2) his claim of 
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cumulative prejudice from various errors allegedly committed 
at trial.  (Id. at A0003-04.)  Those are the issues Collins 
brings to us now.    
 
II. Procedural Default 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must consider the 
Commonwealth’s contention that we should affirm the 
District Court’s denial of Collins’s habeas petition on the 
basis of procedural default.  “The doctrine of procedural 
default prohibits federal courts from reviewing a state court 
decision involving a federal question if the state court 
decision is based on a rule of state law that is independent of 
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”  
Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 187 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Nara 
v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Procedural 
default occurs when a state court determines that “the 
prisoner … failed to meet a state procedural requirement.”  
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the claims certified for 
appeal are not properly before us.  It asserts that Collins 
raised only the issue of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness 
before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and, therefore, his 
claims against trial counsel were waived and thus 
procedurally defaulted.  We reject that argument.   
 
Collins did raise his ineffective assistance claim as to 
trial counsel, and it was reviewed on the merits.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the claim was 
properly layered with a claim of ineffective assistance from 
appellate counsel, consistent with Commonwealth v. Grant, 
813 A.2d 726, 733 (Pa. 2002).  The court stated that, 
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“[b]ecause [Collins] was represented by new counsel on 
direct appeal, and his appeal was pending on collateral review 
prior to our decision in [Grant], these [ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel] claims are cognizable only as ‘layered 
claims.’”  Collins, 957 A.2d at 244.  Under a layered-claim 
analysis, Collins had to plead and prove that trial counsel was 
ineffective.  We have held that “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, 
where ineffectiveness claims are properly layered, there is no 
waiver and no procedural default.”  Showers v. Beard, 635 
F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting Commonwealth’s 
procedural default claims and finding them waived; 
proceeding to the merits where the state court addressed both 
effectiveness claims on the merits).  Here, “the PCRA court 
and the [Supreme Court] addressed the ineffectiveness claims 
against both trial and appellate counsel on the merits.”  Id. at 
629 n.4.  Likewise, the Magistrate Judge viewed the 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel as the main issue.  Therefore, 
the Commonwealth’s procedural default arguments regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel are unpersuasive.
6
    
                                              
6
   The Commonwealth also contends that Collins only 
raised claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
before the District Court and raises claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for the first time on appeal.  This is 
inaccurate, as Collins’s habeas petition clearly indicates.  See 
Petition for Habeas Corpus at 9, Collins v. Beard, No. 10-
05950 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2012) (“A. Trial Counsel Adopted a 
Facially Implausible Defense.”).  The Commonwealth may 
actually have waived its procedural default argument on this 
point, given that, in the District Court, it did not assert that 
Collins’s claims were waived as to everything except 
appellate counsel.  See Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 629 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) 
 22 
 
As for Collins’s claim of cumulative error, the 
Commonwealth argues that it too is defaulted because it was 
not raised in state court and is therefore unexhausted.
7
  
Collins responds that “the cumulative error doctrine is a 
required method of conducting prejudice analysis,” not a 
standalone constitutional claim, and that the underlying errors 
were raised in state court and are therefore exhausted.  
(Appellant’s Reply Br. at 21.)  We have not had occasion 
before to hold that a cumulative error argument constitutes a 
standalone constitutional claim subject to exhaustion and 
procedural default, but, with the issue squarely presented 
now, we so rule.  Collins’s cumulative error claim was not 
raised before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and is 
therefore not properly before us.   
 
“Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state 
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the ‘opportunity to pass 
upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal 
rights.’”  Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting 
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam)).  
The Supreme Court has instructed that a claim is not “fairly 
presented” if the state court “must read beyond a petition or a 
                                                                                                     
(in habeas context, procedural default is normally a defense 
that the State is obligated to raise)). 
7
 The Magistrate Judge concluded that Collins had 
presented the underlying claims to the PCRA court, but did 
not know if the cumulative error claim had been presented to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Accordingly, the 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the claim be dismissed 
on the merits.   
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brief … in order to find material” that indicates the presence 
of a federal claim.  Id. at 32.  A claim is procedurally 
defaulted if the petitioner failed to exhaust that claim in state 
court and if state procedures prohibit the petitioner from later 
presenting the claim in state court.  See Jimenez v. Walker, 
458 F.3d 130, 149 (2d Cir. 2006) ( “Under the procedural-
default doctrine, when a prisoner has exhausted his state 
remedies but has not given the state courts a fair opportunity 
to pass on his federal claims, the prisoner has procedurally 
defaulted his claims ….”); Bridges v. Beard, 941 F. Supp. 2d 
584, 621 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (discussing exhaustion and 
procedural default requirements).
8
 
 
We thus do not agree with Collins’s assertion that 
cumulative error is only a method of conducting prejudice 
review.  The cumulative error doctrine allows a petitioner to 
present a standalone claim asserting the cumulative effect of 
errors at trial that so undermined the verdict as to constitute a 
denial of his constitutional right to due process.  See Albrecht 
v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 139 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that 
petitioner could not show that the cumulative prejudice of 
trial errors “undermined the reliability of the verdict”).  
Specifically, we have said that  
                                              
8
 Collins does not attempt to show either cause and 
prejudice for the default or a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice and so we do not address those exceptions to the 
procedural default rule.  See Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 
149 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 
495-96)(1986)) (holding petitioner ineligible for habeas relief 
on cumulative error claim when it was not exhausted and 
petitioner did not attempt to show cause and prejudice or a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice). 
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Individual errors that do not entitle a petitioner 
to relief may do so when combined, if 
cumulatively the prejudice resulting from them 
undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial 
and denied him his constitutional right to due 
process.  Cumulative errors are not harmless if 
they had a substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict, 
which means that a habeas petitioner is not 
entitled to relief based on cumulative errors 
unless he can establish actual prejudice.  
 
Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).  Here, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed each alleged 
underlying error and rejected each on its merits, but it was not 
presented with a separate claim of cumulative error.  See 
Collins, 957 A.2d at 243-44 (listing the fifteen claims raised).  
 
Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 
Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1454 (5th Cir. 1992) (en 
banc), that cumulative error relief is available so long as the 
individual errors were themselves not procedurally defaulted, 
several other circuits disagree and treat cumulative error 
claims as distinct claims subject to exhaustion and procedural 
default.  See, e.g., Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1026 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] cumulative error claim must be clearly 
identified in a petitioner’s brief before a state court to be 
exhausted.”); Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 149 (holding that 
cumulative error claim must be fairly presented to state court 
to later be considered by federal courts on habeas review); 
Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2006) 
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(“Because [the petitioner] did not raise his claim of 
cumulative error in the state courts, it is procedurally 
defaulted.”); Gonzales v. McKune, 279 F.3d 922, 925 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (finding default on habeas review because state 
court was not asked to consider cumulative error and 
therefore never had opportunity to consider it); Bridges, 941 
F. Supp. 2d at 621 (listing cases supporting the holding that 
cumulative error claim, which was not presented to state 
court, was unexhausted and defaulted as an independent basis 
for habeas relief).  Those decisions comport with the long-
held view that in order to satisfy exhaustion, a state habeas 
petitioner must present the “substantial equivalent” of his 
federal claim to the state courts in order to give the state 
courts “an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to 
the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.”  Picard v. 
Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971).  Because “[b]riefing a 
number of isolated errors that turn out to be insufficient to 
warrant reversal does not automatically require the court to 
consider whether the cumulative effect of the alleged errors 
prejudiced the petitioner,” Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025, we now 
join those courts that hold that a claim of cumulative error 
must be presented to the state courts before it may provide a 
basis for habeas relief.  See  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) 
(exhaustion requirement).  Collins’s cumulative error claim 
was not presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as an 
individual claim for relief and, hence, was not exhausted in 
state court.  It is now too late for him to return to the state 
courts to exhaust that claim, and it is therefore procedurally 
defaulted and not properly before us.   
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III.  Standard of Review 
 
As is generally true in habeas corpus cases, this appeal 
is heavily influenced by a standard of review that dictates 
how much deference we must give to state court rulings.  
That standard, a function of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 
does not “permit federal judges to … casually second-guess 
the decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense 
attorneys.”  Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013).  Under 
AEDPA, habeas relief is not available for any “claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits” in state court unless that 
adjudication either “resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court,” or was founded on an “unreasonable determination of 
the facts.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).  Collins contends that 
“[t]he state court’s assertions are unreasonable applications” 
of federal law “and unreasonable in light of the state court 
record.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 28.)  We focus on the 
“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d).  A state court 
decision is an “unreasonable application” of federal law “if 
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle 
from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).   
 
Under the strictures of the “unreasonable application” 
clause, a federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus 
simply because it “concludes in its independent judgment that 
the state-court decision applied a Supreme Court case 
incorrectly.”  Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 417 (3d Cir. 
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2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Instead, the 
petitioner must “show that the state court applied that case to 
the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “It bears repeating 
that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 
court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”  Harrington 
v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).  Section 2254(d) 
authorizes us to issue a writ of habeas corpus only “in cases 
where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree 
that the state court’s decision conflicts with th[e Supreme] 
Court’s precedents.”  Id.  Under this highly deferential 
standard, “we will not surmise whether the state court reached 
the best or even the correct result in [a] case; rather, we will 
determine only ‘whether the state court’s application of 
[federal law] was unreasonable.’”  Rountree v. Balicki, 640 
F.3d 530, 538 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 
785). 
 
 The clearly established law chiefly at issue in this case 
is the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, which provides a two-pronged test for reviewing 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.   466 U.S. at 687-88.  
A petitioner must prove both (1) that “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” and (2) that petitioner was prejudiced by that 
subpar performance.  Id. at 688, 694.  But, before examining 
the state courts’ application of Strickland, we first have to 
determine whether Collins’s claims were adjudicated on the 
merits, since the distinction between claims that have been so 
adjudicated and claims that have not been means the 
difference between highly deferential review and de novo 
review.  Cf. Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2009) 
(“Because the state court did not decide whether [the 
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prisoner’s] counsel was deficient, we review this element of 
[his] Strickland claim de novo.”); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying de novo review when 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court never considered petitioner’s 
constructive denial of counsel claim, and instead treated claim 
as one of ineffective assistance of counsel).
9
   
 
Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused its 
decision on Savino’s failure to present ballistics evidence.  
See Collins, 957 A.2d at 250.  Collins, however, presents his 
Strickland claim as the broader assertion that Savino utterly 
failed to investigate and prepare for the case, which included, 
in part, the failure to present ballistics evidence.  That broader 
claim is indeed the one that the District Court certified for 
appeal to us.  We are therefore faced with the question of 
whether Collins “fairly presented” that broader claim to the 
state courts and if the state courts adjudicated it on the 
merits.
10
  We conclude that the broader claim was presented 
                                              
9
 If there has been no adjudication on the merits of a 
claim, “the federal habeas court must conduct a de novo 
review over pure legal questions and mixed questions of law 
and fact.”  Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).  
State court factual determinations are “presumed to be 
correct,” absent clear and convincing evidence of error.  Id. 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).   
10
 Often, a question of this type is stated in terms of 
“exhaustion,” that is, whether the claim at issue was pursued 
in a manner that took advantage of all state court remedies.  
In looking at what claims were presented to state courts for 
the purposes of determining the applicable standard of 
review, we ask whether a court was given the opportunity to 
address a specific claim, regardless of whether the court 
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to and adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, and that 
the narrower focus of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on 
ballistics evidence does not affect our standard of review.  
 
The record reveals that Collins presented to the PCRA 
court, and that the court reached, both the narrow claim that 
Savino failed to refute the ballistics evidence and the broader 
claim that he did not properly investigate and prepare for trial 
and retain expert testimony.  The PCRA court denied both 
claims on the merits, explicitly ruling that Collins had not 
established that Savino’s performance was constitutionally 
deficient.  As to the narrower claim, the PCRA court ruled 
that “no prejudice has been shown by [Savino’s] failure to 
[retain a ballistics expert].”  (J.A. at A0118.)  The PCRA 
court likewise decided that Collins had not demonstrated 
prejudice regarding his broader claim of lack of preparation 
and presentation of exculpatory evidence.  (See J.A. at 
A0106-09.)  On PCRA appeal, Collins challenged the PCRA 
court’s denial of both the narrower and the broader claims, 
and argued that the PCRA’s findings as to counsel’s 
representation and lack of prejudice were erroneous.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the PCRA 
court’s rulings on these claims, as well as Collins’s 
arguments, but affirmed on the ground that Savino’s 
                                                                                                     
actually addressed that claim.  See Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 
332, 333-34 (1978) (per curiam) (holding that habeas 
exhaustion requirement is not dependent on whether the state 
court’s opinion references a claim, which was raised in 
petitioner’s brief before that court, but rather if it was 
properly raised). 
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performance was not constitutionally deficient without ruling 
on prejudice.  Collins, 957 A.2d at 248-50.   
 
We are persuaded that these state court decisions 
resulted in an adjudication on the merits of both Collins’s 
narrower and broader claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel to which we must defer under AEDPA.  Section 
2254(d) deference applies to any claim that has been 
adjudicated on the merits in any state court proceeding, which 
“can occur at any level of state court” as long as the state 
court’s resolution has preclusive effect.  Thomas v. Horn, 570 
F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that under § 2254(d) a 
claim has been adjudicated on the merits “when a state court 
has made a decision that finally resolves the claim based on 
its substance, not on a procedural, or other, ground”).  In 
Collins’s case, there is no question that the PCRA court 
denied both the narrower and broader claims of 
ineffectiveness assistance on the merits and expressly ruled 
on each of the two prongs of the Strickland test.  Although in 
affirming the PCRA court’s decision, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court discussed counsel’s performance in the 
context of the narrower claim only,
11
 nothing in its opinion 
                                              
11
 An argument can be made that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court answered the question as it was put to it.  In 
his briefing before that court, Collins presented what may be 
characterized as a single ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim with two issues as supporting arguments: that Savino 
was ineffective for following a deficient “outside shooter” 
defense theory because of his inadequate preparation and 
investigation; and, more pointedly, that he was ineffective for 
failing to consult a ballistics expert.  Even though the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the ballistics 
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questioned or undermined the PCRA court’s more specific 
rulings.  The lack of an express ruling from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court on the question of prejudice does not negate 
the PCRA court’s decision that Collins was not prejudiced.  
Collins’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, framed 
both narrowly and broadly and tested under each of 
Strickland’s prongs, was adjudicated on the merits in state 
court, even if only at the PCRA court level.  Therefore, under 
the circumstances presented in this case, the PCRA court’s 
determination as to prejudice is owed deference under 
AEDPA.
12 
 Cf. Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                     
evidence, it ultimately held that Savino’s trial strategy was 
not, in fact, limited to the outside shooter theory, but was 
more generally aimed at creating a reasonable doubt, and that 
he “cho[se] to cast suspicion simultaneously on both Cofer 
and the supposed Boys from the Bottom gang rather than 
attempt to find a competing defense ballistician to paint Cofer 
as the only possible perpetrator.”  Collins, 957 A.2d at 249.  
Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court arguably 
adjudicated the claim as presented to it, determining that 
Savino, in fact, pursued a defense strategy to cast doubt on 
both Cofer and the Boys from the Bottom and rejecting 
Collins’s initial assertion about Savino’s strategy.       
12
 We recognize that our approach in this case may 
seem at odds with the approach approved by the Seventh 
Circuit in Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 421-22 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, Woolley v. Harrington, 134 S. Ct. 95 
(2013).  In Woolley, the Seventh Circuit applied de novo 
review where the opinion of the state’s appellate court was 
“silent on defense counsel’s performance,” even though the 
state PCRA court had expressly ruled on both prongs of the 
Strickland test.  Id. at 422.  In the Seventh Circuit’s view, the 
 32 
 
2008) (reviewing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision 
for the first prong of the Strickland analysis, but the PCRA 
court’s ruling for the prejudice prong).   
 
                                                                                                     
opinion of the state’s appellate court was the “last reasoned 
opinion on the claim,” and thus the only decision entitled to 
AEDPA deference.  Id. at 421-22.  We think our approach is 
the better course in reviewing Collins’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Our approach is especially appropriate 
in light of the United States Supreme Court’s repeated 
admonitions that AEDPA mandates broad deference to the 
decisions of the state courts.  See, e.g., Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 16 
(“We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice 
system has experienced the extreme malfunction for which 
federal habeas relief is the remedy.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-88.  In any event, even if 
we were to apply de novo review to the PCRA court’s 
prejudice rulings in Collins’s case, the result would be the 
same for the reasons discussed infra Part IV.  See Richter, 
131 S. Ct. at 787-88 (stating that even under de novo review, 
prejudice is established only where counsel’s errors are “so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.”). 
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IV. Discussion13 
 
To summarize, we must decide whether, viewed with 
the deference required by AEDPA, the state courts’ denial of 
Collins’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was based 
on an “unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Strickland.  
 
Turning to the merits, we begin with the center of 
gravity in this case: the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  As previously noted, Strickland provides a two-
pronged test for reviewing such claims.  466 U.S. at 687-88.  
First, the petitioner must show that “counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under 
“prevailing professional norms.”  Id. at 688.  Second, the 
petitioner must show prejudice such that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Id. at 694.  On habeas review, we are “doubly 
deferential” in considering counsel’s performance: the state 
court was obligated on post-conviction review to view that 
performance deferentially, and, under AEDPA, we must give 
wide deference to the state court’s conclusions, disturbing 
them only if the state court unreasonably applied either of the 
                                              
13
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Collins’s 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253.  The District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, so our review of that Court’s decision is plenary.  
Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 416 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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prongs of Strickland.  Titlow, 133 S. Ct. at 13; Knowles v. 
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).  
 
While we believe that the appropriate route to 
resolving this appeal is to consider whether the PCRA court 
correctly applied the prejudice prong – which we think it did 
in concluding that Collins was not prejudiced by Savino’s 
representation – we would be remiss if we did not comment 
briefly on trial counsel’s dismal preparation for a high stakes 
case.  Under Strickland’s objective-reasonableness prong, the 
question of whether counsel had a reasonable strategy 
necessarily includes the question of whether that strategy was 
reasonably arrived at.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 
(“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation.”); Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“Only choices made after a reasonable investigation of 
the factual scenario are entitled to a presumption of 
validity.”).  Savino’s approach to this capital case was in 
many ways deeply troubling.  It is not that he did everything 
wrong.  He obtained useful information on cross-examination 
and he quite rightly, and vigorously, objected to the trial 
court’s determination to permit the last-minute ballistics 
evidence and other expert testimony.  But it seems he 
conducted no investigation whatsoever.  He interviewed no 
witnesses, including the one eye-witness, and instead cross-
examined them cold at trial; he failed to interview the 
Commonwealth’s firearms expert or obtain his own; and he 
did not engage any other forensic expert.  Cf. Siehl v. Grace, 
561 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a state-court 
ruling was not an objectively reasonable application of 
Strickland when trial counsel sought no forensic experts or 
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evidence).  His representation of Collins was so deficient at 
the sentencing phase that it was declared ineffective by the 
Pennsylvania courts.  Collins’s assertion is not, as the 
Magistrate Judge concluded, that “Savino automatically loses 
the benefit of a presumption of reasonable strategic 
decisionmaking simply because he did not consult with a 
ballistics expert” (J.A. at A0021) but, rather, that Savino loses 
the presumption because he conducted no investigation and 
consulted with no one.  During the PCRA hearing, Savino 
responded to the question “that’s the strategic decision that 
you made, to rely on yourself?” with the answer, “[y]es, sir.”  
(Id. at A1281.)  It is hard to imagine why effective counsel in 
a capital case involving ballistics, chemical, and medical 
expert testimony would decline to seek the assistance of 
competent experts to advise the defense.  So, while we do not 
rule on whether Savino’s performance fell below the 
constitutional minimum of effectiveness, it is not surprising 
that Judge Brody declared the performance to be “clearly 
inadequate.”  (Id. at A0003.) 
 
Our focus, though, is on the prejudice prong of 
Strickland.  Again, to show prejudice under Strickland, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceedings would have been different.”  466 
U.S. at 694.  A reasonable probability is one “sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  Prejudice is 
reviewed in light of the totality of the evidence at trial and the 
testimony at the collateral review hearing.  Rolan, 445 F.3d at 
682.  The PCRA court held that “no prejudice has been 
shown by [Savino’s] failure to [retain a ballistics expert]” 
(J.A. at A0118); that the lack of preparation and inadequate 
pretrial consultation with Collins would not “change the 
 36 
 
verdict in this case” (id. at A0107); that Collins “suffered no 
prejudice” (id. at A0108) from Savino’s failure to interview 
additional witnesses; and that Collins did not “demonstrate 
how he was prejudiced” by Savino’s lack of investigation of 
witnesses (id. at A0109).  Although these are admittedly 
cursory statements, AEDPA requires that we “determine what 
arguments or theories supported or … could have supported, 
the state court’s decision.”  Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 
 
The primary evidence before the jury consisted of 
Cofer’s eye-witness account and the damning physical 
evidence, especially Graves’s wounds, the bullet trajectories, 
and lead residue.  Therefore, Collins argues, he was 
prejudiced because Savino’s failure to investigate the forensic 
evidence affected his entire defense theory, and the jury was 
deprived of competing evidence on the main factual issue: 
where the shots originated.  Collins claims that “[a] jury that 
was aware both of Cofer’s credibility problems and that the 
physical evidence favored Cofer as the shooter would likely 
have acquitted Collins.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 39.)   
 
The problem for Collins is that Cofer’s credibility was 
aggressively attacked and, more importantly, the physical 
evidence does not favor the defense.  Especially when viewed 
through AEDPA’s deferential lens, the PCRA court’s 
determination on prejudice – a determination that has 
preclusive effect, see supra Part III – was not an unreasonable 
application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1).      
 
Reviewing the arguments that “could have supported” 
that court’s holding, Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786, we conclude 
that the decision on prejudice reflects a reasonable application 
of Strickland, based on the totality of the available evidence – 
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both presented at trial and at the PCRA hearing.  See 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 398 (describing state prejudice 
determination as unreasonable for failing to evaluate the 
totality of the evidence).  Given the medical examiner’s 
testimony, the damaging letters from Collins to Cofer, 
Welch’s admission at the PCRA hearing that the shots could 
have come from a passenger in the backseat, the blood on 
Collins’s pants, and his ownership of a gun matching the 
caliber of the murder weapon, the state court was not 
objectively unreasonable in determining that there was no 
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have 
been different if Savino had prepared differently.  “Although 
‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ with the way the state 
court weighed the evidence in this case,” Rountree, 640 F.3d. 
at 544 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 
(2004)), it was not an unreasonable application of federal law 
for the state court to say that Savino’s failures – whether 
described as a lack of preparation or confined to the ballistics 
evidence – did not raise a reasonable probability of a changed 
outcome, for reasons we more fully consider next.  
 
First, the Commonwealth correctly asserts that the 
“uncontradicted and unequivocal testimony of the medical 
examiner,” Dr. McDonald, which would not have been 
refuted by an expert ballistician’s testimony, was of great 
importance in showing that the shooter was behind the victim.  
(Appellee’s Br. at 33.)  At trial, McDonald testified that one 
of the gunshot wounds had a pattern that was “forward, to the 
right, and slightly downward.”  (J.A. at A0678.)  This was no 
doubt highly convincing evidence to the jury that a shot was 
fired from behind, especially given the exit wound under the 
eye.  McDonald also testified that the other bullet went 
“rightward, slightly downward and forward” (id. at A0676) 
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and that there was a “graze wound of the left upper portion of 
the head going forward and to the right” (id. at A0674).  
Those trajectories indicate a shot traveling forward rather 
than a shot directly to the right, and no alternative forensic 
explanation of that evidence was introduced.  It is reasonable 
under Strickland to conclude that no amount of additional 
investigation on Savino’s part would have changed the 
physical evidence relied on by the medical examiner, which 
alone went far in establishing that the shots came from behind 
Graves.  
 
Second, although Welch testified at the PCRA hearing 
that he would have refuted Finor’s ballistics testing and 
proposed that the shots could not have come from the 
backseat, that testimony did not withstand cross-examination.  
As the Magistrate Judge noted, Welch “was forced to concede 
… that the physical evidence was consistent with the shooter” 
inside the car – either in the driver’s seat or the backseat.  (Id. 
at A0021 n.7.)  The claim that the shooter was in the driver’s 
seat rather than the backseat was substantially undermined by 
the bullets that went straight into the dashboard, as Welch 
effectively acknowledged.  Welch also had to concede that 
“his principle reason for opining that the shooter did not sit in 
the rear of the car had nothing to do with specialized ballistics 
… but rather his belief that it would be awkward” to shoot 
around the headrest.  (Id.)
14
  The Magistrate Judge was 
                                              
14
 The Commonwealth contends that Collins told the 
police that he was sitting in the middle of the backseat and 
not directly behind the passenger.  He thus would not have 
had to reach around the seat.  However, at trial, Collins 
testified that there was a tire behind the driver’s seat and a 
radio in the middle of the backseat.   
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therefore on firm ground in saying that Welch’s proposed 
expert testimony would not “have created a reasonable 
probability of an acquittal” (J.A. at A0021) because, at most, 
it only showed another possible shooter, and Savino had 
already pointed to both Cofer and the Boys from the Bottom 
to fill that role.  Welch’s testimony on the whole adds only 
marginally to the defense Savino mounted, as it raises some 
suspicion about Cofer but gives no supporting physical 
evidence.  This is not a case where, as Collins argues, 
“rebuttal testimony from a credible, objective expert witness 
… would have cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s case.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 40 (quoting Showers, 635 F.3d at 
634).)  On the contrary, Welch’s cross-examination testimony 
at the PCRA hearing shows that he would have largely 
confirmed the Commonwealth’s case – namely that the shots 
were fired from inside the car and possibly from the rear seat.  
Had Savino more explicitly argued that Cofer shot Graves 
from inside the car, as Collins claims Savino should have 
argued, it would still be sheer speculation to conclude that 
Welch’s testimony would have changed the jury’s decision to 
believe that Cofer, not Collins, was the shooter.  
 
Third, the Commonwealth introduced letters from 
Collins to Cofer that hurt Collins’s credibility and supported 
Cofer’s initial statements to police and his pretrial hearing 
testimony that Collins shot Graves.  For example, one letter 
ended with the plea, “[l]ook, man, I know you ain’t that type 
of dude that want to be label [sic] a snitch and I know for real 
you ain’t built like that, so straighten this out as soon as 
possible.”  (Id. at A0542.)  It is true that the jury could have 
decided that those words from Collins were a sincere effort to 
persuade Cofer to recant lies that Cofer had earlier told when 
implicating him.  But it is also true that the jurors could have 
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viewed the letters as witness tampering by a guilty man, and 
it appears that that is indeed how they viewed them.  
Moreover, taken together with the letters, Cofer’s dodgy 
testimony at trial made his initial statements to the police all 
the more credible.  What is important here is that no pretrial 
investigation or ballistics expert was going to make the letters 
disappear or explain them away.  That conclusion is 
buttressed by the fact that the letters were given to the 
Commonwealth in the middle of trial, making any rebuttal 
preparation improbable.  Although Savino’s choice not to 
interview Cofer before cross-examination was highly 
questionable, we cannot say that it was objectively 
unreasonable for the state court to conclude that additional 
preparation for cross-examination would not have created a 
reasonable probability of an acquittal. 
 
Finally, and though there is a disconcerting irony in it, 
the fact that the ballistics evidence and expert testimony were 
introduced at such a late stage in the trial undercuts Collins’s 
prejudice claim.  Because the headrest testing was a surprise, 
and despite Savino’s failure to promptly prepare when the 
prosecution first told him of it, the effect of anything he could 
have done to counter the evidence would have been limited 
by the short time that he had.
15
  It was not Savino’s fault that 
the Commonwealth introduced the testing so late.  There was 
                                              
15
 This is not a case where the Commonwealth is 
alleged to have withheld evidence or delayed in bad faith.  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that Collins “does not 
dispute the PCRA court’s finding that the Commonwealth 
disclosed the lead residue report on the very same day it was 
obtained, nor does he allege that the prosecutor was aware of 
the test results before that time.”  Collins, 957 A.2d at 254.  
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no forewarning and little, if anything, he could have done 
before the trial to prepare for it.  Thus, the timing of the 
introduction of the ballistics evidence also weighs against a 
finding of prejudice.     
 
Our decision about the lack of prejudice is not made 
lightly.  Counterfactuals necessarily involve some 
speculation, and we cannot say with certainty that the result 
of Collins’s trial would have been the same even if Savino 
had been better prepared for trial and hired appropriate 
experts.  But that is not the standard we must apply.  We look 
only far enough to determine if the state court reasonably 
applied federal law.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  We do not 
ask whether we “believe[] the state court’s determination 
under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that 
determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher 
threshold.”  Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123 (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  On the whole, it was not 
an unreasonable application of federal law for the state court 
to say that Savino’s failures – whether they be broadly 
described as a lack of preparation or confined to the ballistics 
evidence – did not raise a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome. 
 
Therefore, the PCRA court, the highest state court to 
expressly address the question of prejudice, did not 
unreasonably apply Strickland in holding that Collins could 
not establish prejudice, and we are bound to uphold that 
conclusion.   
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V. Conclusion 
 
Although the performance of Collins’s trial counsel 
may well have been constitutionally deficient, fairminded 
jurists could agree with the PCRA court’s decision that 
Collins failed to show prejudice and so cannot establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.  In 
addition, his cumulative error claim is procedurally defaulted.  
We will therefore affirm the decision of the District Court to 
deny Collins’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
